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Abstract—Redundant and irrelevant features in data have caused a long-term problem in network traffic classification. These features
not only slow down the process of classification but also prevent a classifier from making accurate decisions, especially when coping
with big data. In this paper, we propose a mutual information based algorithm that analytically selects the optimal feature for
classification. This mutual information based feature selection algorithm can handle linearly and nonlinearly dependent data features.
Its effectiveness is evaluated in the cases of network intrusion detection. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS), named Least Square
Support Vector Machine based IDS (LSSVM-IDS), is built using the features selected by our proposed feature selection algorithm. The
performance of LSSVM-IDS is evaluated using three intrusion detection evaluation datasets, namely KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and
Kyoto 2006+ dataset. The evaluation results show that our feature selection algorithm contributes more critical features for LSSVM-IDS
to achieve better accuracy and lower computational cost compared with the state-of-the-art methods.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, Feature selection, Mutual information, Linear correlation coefficient, Least square support vector
machine
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D ESPITE increasing awareness of network security, theexisting solutions remain incapable of fully protecting
internet applications and computer networks against the
threats from ever-advancing cyber attack techniques such
as DoS attack and computer malware. Developing effective
and adaptive security approaches, therefore, has become
more critical than ever before. The traditional security tech-
niques, as the first line of security defence, such as user
authentication, firewall and data encryption, are insufficient
to fully cover the entire landscape of network security while
facing challenges from ever-evolving intrusion skills and
techniques [1]. Hence, another line of security defence is
highly recommended, such as Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). Recently, an IDS alongside with anti-virus software
has become an important complement to the security in-
frastructure of most organizations. The combination of these
two lines provides a more comprehensive defence against
those threats and enhances network security.
A significant amount of research has been conducted
to develop intelligent intrusion detection techniques, which
help achieve better network security. Bagged boosting-based
on C5 decision trees [2] and Kernel Miner [3] are two of
the earliest attempts to build intrusion detection schemes.
Methods proposed in [4] and [5] have successfully applied
machine learning techniques, such as Support Vector Ma-
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chine (SVM), to classify network traffic patterns that do not
match normal network traffic. Both systems were equipped
with five distinct classifiers to detect normal traffic and four
different types of attacks (i.e., DoS, probing, U2R and R2L).
Experimental results show the effectiveness and robustness
of using SVM in IDS. Mukkamala et al. [6] investigated
the possibility of assembling various learning methods,
including Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), SVMs and
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) to detect
intrusions. They trained five different classifiers to distin-
guish the normal traffic from the four different types of
attacks. They compared the performance of each of the
learning methods with their model and found that the
ensemble of ANNs, SVMs and MARS achieved the best
performance in terms of classification accuracies for all the
five classes. Toosi et al. [7] combined a set of neuro-fuzzy
classifiers in their design of a detection system, in which
a genetic algorithm was applied to optimize the structures
of neuro-fuzzy systems used in the classifiers. Based on the
pre-determined fuzzy inference system (i.e., classifiers), de-
tection decision was made on the incoming traffic. Recently,
we proposed an anomaly-based scheme for detecting DoS
attacks [8]. The system has been evaluated on KDD Cup 99
and ISCX 2012 datasets and achieved promising detection
accuracy of 99.95% and 90.12% respectively.
However, current network traffic data, which are often
huge in size, present a major challenge to IDSs [9]. These
“big data” slow down the entire detection process and
may lead to unsatisfactory classification accuracy due to the
computational difficulties in handling such data. Classifying
a huge amount of data usually causes many mathematical
difficulties which then lead to higher computational com-
plexity. As a well-known intrusion evaluation dataset, KDD
Cup 99 dataset is a typical example of large-scale datasets.
This dataset consists of more than five million of training
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samples and two million of testing samples respectively.
Such a large scale dataset retards the building and testing
processes of a classifier, or makes the classifier unable to
perform due to system failures caused by insufficient mem-
ory. Furthermore, large-scale datasets usually contain noisy,
redundant, or uninformative features which present critical
challenges to knowledge discovery and data modeling.
To address the aforementioned problems on the methods
for feature selection, we have proposed a hybrid feature
selection algorithm (HFSA) in [10]. HFSA consists of two
phases. The upper phase conducts a preliminary search
to eliminate irrelevant and redundancy features from the
original data. This helps the wrapper method (the lower
phase) to decrease the searching range from the entire
original feature space to the pre-selected features (the output
of the upper phase). In this paper, we extend our work
discussed in [10]. The key contributions of this paper are
listed as follows.
1) This work proposes a new filter-based feature se-
lection method, in which theoretical analysis of
mutual information is introduced to evaluate the
dependence between features and output classes.
The most relevant features are retained and used
to construct classifiers for respective classes. As an
enhancement of Mutual Information Feature Selec-
tion (MIFS) [11] and Modified Mutual Information-
based Feature Selection (MMIFS) [12], the proposed
feature selection method does not have any free
parameter, such as β in MIFS and MMIFS. There-
fore, its performance is free from being influenced
by any inappropriate assignment of value to a free
parameter and can be guaranteed. Moreover, the
proposed method is feasible to work in various
domains, and more efficient in comparison with
HFSA [10], where the computationally expensive
wrapper-based feature selection mechanism is used.
2) We conduct complete experiments on two well-
known IDS datasets in addition to the dataset used
in [10]. This is very important in evaluating the
performance of IDS since KDD dataset is outdated
and does not contain most novel attack patterns in
it. In addition, these datasets are frequently used in
the literature to evaluate the performance of IDS.
Moreover, these datasets have various sample sizes
and different numbers of features, so they provide
a lot more challenges for comprehensively testing
feature selection algorithms.
3) Different from the detection framework proposed
in [10] that designs only for binary classification,
we design our proposed framework to consider
multiclass classification problems. This is to show
the effectiveness and the feasibility of the proposed
method.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 out-
lines the related works to this study. Section 3 introduces
the proposed feature selection algorithm FMIFS. Section 4
briefly describes the concept of Least Square Support Vector
Machine (LS-SVM) and details the detection framework
showing different detection stages involved in the proposed
scheme. Section 5 presents the experimental details and
results. Finally, we draw a conclusion and discuss our future
work in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORKS
2.1 Feature Selection
Feature selection is a technique for eliminating irrelevant
and redundant features and selecting the most optimal
subset of features that produce a better characterization
of patterns belonging to different classes. Methods for fea-
ture selection are generally classified into filter and wrap-
per methods [12]. Filter algorithms utilize an independent
measure (such as, information measures, distance measures,
or consistency measures) as a criterion for estimating the
relation of a set of features, while wrapper algorithms make
use of particular learning algorithms to evaluate the value
of features. In comparison with filter methods, wrapper
methods are often much more computationally expensive
when dealing with high-dimensional data or large-scale
data. In this study hence, we focus on filter methods for
IDS.
Due to the continuous growth of data dimensionality,
feature selection as a pre-processing step is becoming an
essential part in building intrusion detection systems [13].
Mukkamala and Sung [14] proposed a novel feature selec-
tion algorithm to reduce the feature space of KDD Cup 99
dataset from 41 dimensions to 6 dimensions and evaluated
the 6 selected features using an IDS based on SVM. The
results show that the classification accuracy increases by
1% when using the selected features. Chebrolu et al. [15]
investigated the performance in the use of a Markov blanket
model and decision tree analysis for feature selection, which
showed its capability of reducing the number of features
in KDD Cup 99 from 41 to 12 features. Chen et al. [16]
proposed an IDS based on Flexible Neural Tree (FNT). The
model applied a pre-processing feature selection phase to
improve the detection performance. Using the KDD Cup 99,
FNT model achieved 99.19% detection accuracy with only 4
features.
Recently, Amiri [12] proposed a forward feature selec-
tion algorithm using the mutual information method to
measure the relation among features. The optimal feature
set was then used to train the LS-SVM classifier and build
the IDS. Horng et al. [17] proposed an SVM-based IDS,
which combines a hierarchical clustering and the SVM. The
hierarchical clustering algorithm was used to provide the
classifier with fewer and higher quality training data to
reduce the average training and testing time and improve
the classification performance of the classifier. Experimented
on the corrected labels KDD Cup 99 dataset, which includes
some new attacks, the SVM-based IDS scored an overall
accuracy of 95.75% with a false positive rate of 0.7%.
2.2 Performance Evaluation
All of the aforementioned detection techniques were evalu-
ated on the KDD Cup 99 dataset. However, due to some lim-
itations in this dataset, which will be discussed in Subsection
5.1, some other detection methods [18], [19], [20], [21], [22],
[23] were evaluated using other intrusion detection datasets,
such as NSL-KDD [24] and Kyoto 2006+ [25]. A dimension-
ality reduction method proposed in [25] was to find the most
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important features involved in building a naive bayesian
classifier for intrusion detection. Experiments conducted on
the NSL-KDD dataset produced encouraging results.
Chitrakar et al. [20] proposed a Candidate Support Vec-
tor based Incremental SVM algorithm (CSV-ISVM in short).
The algorithm was applied to network intrusion detection.
They evaluated their CSV-ISVM-based IDS on the Kyoto
2006+ [25] dataset. Experimental results showed that their
IDS produced promising results in terms of detection rate
and false alarm rate. The IDS was claimed to perform real-
time network intrusion detection. Therefore, in this work,
to make a fair comparison with those detection systems,
we evaluate our proposed model on the aforementioned
datasets.
3 FILTER-BASED FEATURE SELECTION
If one considers correlations between network traffic records
to be linear associations, then a linear measure of depen-
dence such as linear correlation coefficient can be used to
measure the dependence between two random variables.
However, considering the real world communication, the
correlation between variables can be nonlinear as well.
Apparently, a linear measure cannot reveal the relation be-
tween two nonlinearly dependent variables. Thus, we need
a measure capable of analysing the relation between two
variables no matter whether they are linearly or nonlinearly
dependent. For these reasons, this work intends to explore
a means of selecting optimal features from a feature space
regardless of the type of correlation between them.
3.1 Feature Selection Based on Mutual Information
Mutual Information (MI) is one of the promising measures
in the realm of variable dependence estimation. Uniquely,
it can cope with not only linearly dependent variables but
also nonlinearly dependent ones. Thus, it is chosen as the
base of our proposed feature selection algorithm.
3.1.1 Mutual Information
MI is a symmetric measure of the relationship between two
random variables. It yields a non-negative value, and a zero
value of MI indicates that the two observed variables are
statistically independent [26].
Given two continuous random variables U =
{u1, u2, ..., ud} and V = {v1, v2, ..., vd}, where d is the total
number of samples, the mutual information between U and
V is defined in (1).
I(U ;V ) = H(U) +H(V )−H(U, V ), (1)
where H(U) and H(V) are the information entropies of U
and V. The information entropies are the measures of un-
certainties of the random variables U and V, where H(U) =
− ∫u p(u) log p(u)du and H(V ) = − ∫v p(v) log p(v)dv, re-
spectively. The joint entropy of U and V is defined as
H(U, V ) = − ∫u ∫v p(u, v) log p(u, v)dudv.
Therefore, to quantify the amount of knowledge on
variable U provided by variable V (and vice versa), which
is known as mutual information, (2) is used.
I(U ;V ) =
∫
u
∫
v
p(u, v) log
p(u, v)
p(u)p(v)
dudv, (2)
where p(u,v) is a joint probability density function (pdf), and
p(u) =
∫
p(u, v)dv and p(v) =
∫
p(u, v)du are the marginal
density functions.
For discrete variables, mutual information between two
discrete random variables with a joint probability mass
function p(u,v) and marginal probabilities p(u) and p(v)
is defined by replacing the integration notation with the
summation notation as shown in (3).
I(U ;V ) =
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
p(u, v) log
p(u, v)
p(u)p(v)
. (3)
In the case of feature selection, a feature is relevant
to the class if it contains important information about the
class; otherwise it is irrelevant or redundant. Since mutual
information is good at quantifying the amount of infor-
mation shared by two random variables, it is often used
as a criterion to evaluate the relevance between a feature
and and a class label [27]. Under this context, features with
high predictive power are the ones that have larger mutual
information I(C; f). On the contrary, in the case of I(C; f)
equal to zero, the feature f and the Class C are proven
to be independent of each other. This means that feature
f contributes redundancy to the classification.
However, due to the reason that the value of the MI
between variables is used as a criterion to select features
from the original set, any computational errors could result
in a significant degradation of the accuracy of any feature
selection algorithms based on this measure. Therefore, the
computation of MI, which requires the estimation of pdfs
or entropies from the input data instances, is not an easy
task. Thus, several estimation techniques could be applied
to compute MI. Histogram and kernel density estimations
are the most popular estimation methods for estimating the
pdfs [28], [29]. Peng et al. [30] claimed that the histogram
approach was computationally efficient, but could produce
a large number of estimation errors. They also stated that
kernel density estimation had a high estimation quality and
at the same time high computational load. Another signif-
icant challenge with histogram techniques is the restriction
to a low-dimensional data space [31]. It has also been
pointed out by Rossi [32] that both histogram and kernel
density approaches suffer from the well-known problem of
high-dimensionality. As this study is working with high-
dimensional data, these two estimations are inapplicable.
To avoid the aforementioned problems, in this work, the
estimator proposed by Kraskov et al. [33] is applied. Unlike
histogram and kernel density estimations, this technique
relies on estimating the entropies of given data using the
average distance from each datum to its k-nearest neighbors.
The novelty of this estimator is its ability to estimate MI
between two random variables of any data space. The
main idea is to estimate the entropy, without knowing the
densities p(u,v), p(u) and p(v), based on the algorithm of k-
nearest neighbors. More details about estimating MI can be
found in [33].
3.1.2 State-of-the-art feature selection algorithms based
on mutual information
Several feature selection algorithms, including those in [11],
[30], [34], [35], [36], have been proposed in literature based
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on the principle of mutual information. Battitis MIFS [11] is
one of the earliest methods that evaluate features based on
their relevance to classification. It harnesses the MI between
the input and the output for each round of selection of
features by calculating I(C; fi) and I(fs, fi), where fs and
fi are candidate features and C is a class label. MIFS selects
the feature that maximises I(C; fi), which is the amount of
information that feature fi carries about the class C , and
is corrected by subtracting a quantity proportional to the
MI with the features selected previously. Numerous studies,
including [34] and [12], have been conducted to improve
Battiti’s MIFS. The enhancements in all of these methods
have been made on the improvement of the second criterion
term as shown in Step 4 of Battiti’s MIFS. However, these
methods present some limitations. For example, there is
not a specific guideline to select an appropriate value for
the parameter β in MIFS [11], MIFS-U [34] and MMIFS
[12]. In addition, the imbalance between the first and the
second terms of the selection criterion in those methods
has not been completely solved. More detailed and clearer
explanation about these methods and their limitations can
be found in Appendix A.
3.1.3 Flexible mutual information based feature selection
To remove the burden of setting an appropriate value for
β as it is required in Battiti’s MIFS, Kwak’s MIFS-U and
Amiri’s MMIFS, a new variation of MIFS is proposed in
this section. This new feature selection approach suggests
an enhancement to the feature selection criterion involved
in the computation of Step 4 of Battiti’s MIFS algorithm
(discussed in Appendix A). Equation (4) shows a new for-
mulation of the feature selection criterion involved, which
is intended to select a feature from an initial input feature
set that maximizes I(C; fi) and minimizes the average of
redundancy MRs simultaneously.
GMI = argmax
fi∈F
(I(C; fi)− 1| S |
∑
fs∈S
MR), (4)
where I(C; fi) is the amount of information that feature fi
carries about the class C. MR, in (4), is the relative minimum
redundancy of feature fi against feature fs and is defined
by (5).
MR =
I(fi; fs)
I(C; fi)
(5)
where fi ∈ F and fs ∈ S. In the case of I(C; fi) = 0,
feature fi can be discarded without computing (4). If fi and
fs are relatively highly dependent with regard to I(C; fi),
feature fi will contribute to redundancy. Thus, to reduce the
number of features that need to be examined, a numerical
threshold Th(= 0) value is applied to GMI in (4) so that
GMI has the following properties:
1) If (GMI = 0), then the current feature fi is irrelevant
or unimportant to the output C because it cannot
provide any additional information to the classifi-
cation after selecting the subset S of features. Thus,
the current candidate fi is removed from S.
2) If (GMI > 0), then the current feature fi is relevant
or important to the output C because it can provide
some additional information to the classification
after selecting the subset S of the feature. Thus, the
current candidate fi is added into S.
3) If (GMI < 0), then the current feature fi is redun-
dant to the output C because it can cause reduction
in the amount of MI between the selected subset
S and the output C . It is worth noting that the
second term in Equation (4), which measure the
redundancy among features, is larger than the first
term, which measure the relevance between feature
fi and the output class. Thus, feature fi is removed
from S.
The selection process of FMIFS is demonstrated in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Flexible mutual information based feature
selection
Input: Feature set F = {fi, i = 1, ..., n}
Output: S - the selected feature subset
begin
Step1. Initialization: set S = φ
Step2. Calculate I(C; fi) for each feature, i = 1, ..., n
Step3. nf = n; Select the feature fi such that:
argmax
fi
(I(C; fi)), i = 1, ..., nf ,
Then, set F ← F\ { fi }; S ← S ∪{ fi }; nf = nf − 1.
Step4. while F 6= φ do
Calculate GMI in (4) to find fi where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nf};
nf = nf − 1;
F ← F\{fi};
if (GMI > 0) then
S ← S ∪ { fi }.
end
end
Step 5. Sort S according to the value of GMI of each selected
feature.
return S
3.2 Feature Selection Based on Linear Correlation Co-
efficient
In order to demonstrate the flexibility and effectiveness of
FMIFS against feature selection based on linear dependence
measure, we substitute MI by Linear Correlation Coefficient
(LCC) in Algorithm 1.
LCC [37] is one of the most popular dependence mea-
sures evaluating the relationship between two random vari-
ables. Whilst LCC is fast and accurate in measuring the
correlation between random linearly dependent variables, it
is insensitive to nonlinear correlations. Given the two same
random variables U and V of the same type, the correlation
coefficient between these two variables is defined in Equa-
tion (6).
corr(U ;V ) =
∑n
i=1(ui − u)(vi − v)√∑n
i=1(ui − u)2
∑n
i=1(vi − v)2
. (6)
The value of corr (U;V) falls in a definite closed interval
[-1,1] . A value close to either -1 or 1 indicates a strong
relationship between the two variables. A value close to
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0 infers a weak relationship between them. Algorithm 2
shows our proposed algorithm based on LCC, and this
algorithm is named Flexible Linear Correlation Coefficient
based Feature Selection (FLCFS). Algorithm 2 is designed to
select a feature that maximizes Gcorr in Equation (7) and to
eliminate irrelevant and redundant features.
Gcorr = argmax
fi∈F
(corr(C; fi)− 1| S |
∑
fs∈S
corr(fi; fs)
corr(C; fi)
). (7)
Algorithm 2 Flexible Linear Correlation Coefficient based
Feature Selection
Input: Feature set F = {fi, i = 1, ..., n}
Output: S - the selected feature subset
begin
Step1. Initialization: S = φ
Step2. Calculate corr(C; fi) for each feature, i = 1, ..., n
Step3. nf = n; Select the feature fi such that:
argmax
fi
(corr(C; fi)), i = 1, ..., nf ,
Then, set F ← F\ { fi }; S ← S ∪{ fi }; nf = nf − 1.
Step4. while F 6= φ do
CalculateGcorr in (7) to find fi where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nf};
nf = nf − 1;
F ← F\{fi};
if (Gcorr > 0) then
S ← S ∪ { fi }.
end
end
Step 5. Sort S according to the value of Gcorr of each
selected feature.
return S
4 INTRUSION DETECTION FRAMEWORK BASED ON
LEAST SQUARE SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
The framework of the proposed intrusion detection sys-
tem is depicted in Figure 1. The detection framework is
comprised of four main phases: (1) data collection, where
sequences of network packets are collected, (2) data prepro-
cessing, where training and test data are preprocessed and
important features that can distinguish one class from the
others are selected, (3) classifier training, where the model
for classification is trained using LS-SVM, and (4) attack
recognition, where the trained classifier is used to detect
intrusions on the test data.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised learning
method [38]. It studies a given labeled dataset and con-
structs an optimal hyperplane in the corresponding data
space to separate the data into different classes. Instead of
solving the classification problem by quadratic program-
ming, Suykens and Vandewalle [39] suggested re-framing
the task of classification into a linear programming problem.
They named this new formulation the Least Squares SVM
(LS-SVM). LS-SVM is a generalized scheme for classification
and also incurs low computation complexity in comparison
with the ordinary SVM scheme [40]. One can find more
details about calculating LS-SVM in Appendix B. The fol-
lowing subsections explain each phase in detail.
4.1 Data Collection
Data collection is the first and a critical step to intrusion
detection. The type of data source and the location where
data is collected from are two determinate factors in the
design and the effectiveness of an IDS. To provide the best
suited protection for the targeted host or networks, this
study proposes a network-based IDS to test our proposed
approaches. The proposed IDS runs on the nearest router
to the victim(s) and monitors the inbound network traffic.
During the training stage, the collected data samples are
categorised with respect to the transport/Internet layer
protocols and are labeled against the domain knowledge.
However, the data collected in the test stage are categorized
according to the protocol types only.
4.2 Data Preprocessing
The data obtained during the phase of data collection are
first processed to generate the basic features such as the ones
in KDD Cup 99 dataset [41]. This phase contains three main
stages shown as follows.
4.2.1 Data transferring
The trained classifier requires each record in the input data
to be represented as a vector of real number. Thus, every
symbolic feature in a dataset is first converted into a numer-
ical value. For example, the KDD CUP 99 dataset contains
numerical as well as symbolic features. These symbolic
features include the type of protocol (i.e., TCP, UDP and
ICMP), service type (e.g., HTTP, FTP, Telnet and so on) and
TCP status flag (e.g., SF, REJ and so on). The method simply
replaces the values of the categorical attributes with numeric
values.
4.2.2 Data normalisation
An essential step of data preprocessing after transferring all
symbolic attributes into numerical values is normalisation.
Data normalisation is a process of scaling the value of each
attribute into a well-proportioned range, so that the bias
in favor of features with greater values is eliminated from
the dataset. Data used in Section 5 are standardised. Every
feature within each record is normalised by the respective
maximum value and falls into the same range of [0-1]. The
transferring and normalisation process will also be applied
to test data.
For KDD Cup 99 and to make a comparison with those
systems that have been evaluated on different types of at-
tacks (discussed in Section 5.5 and Section 5.6), we construct
five classes. One of these classes contains purely the normal
records and the other four hold different types of attacks
(i.e., DoS, Probe, U2R, R2L), respectively.
4.2.3 Feature selection
Even though every connection in a dataset is represented
by various features, not all of these features are needed
to build an IDS. Therefore, it is important to identify the
most informative features of traffic data to achieve higher
performance. In the previous section using Algorithm 1, a
flexible method for the problem of feature selection, FMIFS,
is developed. However, the proposed feature selection al-
gorithms can only rank features in terms of their relevance
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Fig. 1: The framework of the LS-SVM-based intrusion detection system
but they cannot reveal the best number of features that are
needed to train a classifier. Therefore, this study applies the
same technique proposed in [12] to determine the optimal
number of required features. To do so, the technique first
utilizes the proposed feature selection algorithm to rank
all features based on their importance to the classification
processes. Then, incrementally the technique adds features
to the classifier one by one. The final decision of the optimal
number of features in each method is taken once the highest
classification accuracy in the training dataset is achieved.
The selected features for all datasets are depicted in Table
1 [a-c], where each row lists the number and the indexes
of the selected features with respect to the corresponding
feature selection algorithm. In addition, for KDD Cup 99,
the proposed feature selection algorithm is applied for the
aforementioned classes. The selected features are shown in
Table 3.
4.3 Classifier Training
Once the optimal subset of features is selected, this subset is
then taken into the classifier training phase where LS-SVM is
employed. Since SVMs can only handle binary classification
problems and because for KDD Cup 99 five optimal feature
subsets are selected for all classes, five LS-SVM classifiers
need to be employed. Each classifier distinguishes one class
of records from the others. For example the classifier of
Normal class distinguishes Normal data from non-Normal
(All types of attacks). The DoS class distinguishes DoS
traffic from non-DoS data (including Normal, Probe, R2L
and U2R instances) and so on. The five LS-SVM classifiers
are then combined to build the intrusion detection model to
distinguish all different classes.
4.4 Attack Recognition
In general, it is simpler to build a classifier to distinguish
between two classes than considering multiclasses in a prob-
lem. This is because the decision boundaries in the first case
can be simpler. The first part of the experiments in this paper
uses two classes, where records matching to the normal class
are reported as normal data, otherwise are considered as
attacks. However, to deal with a problem having more than
two classes, there are two popular techniques: “One-Vs-
One” (OVO) and “One-Vs-All” (OVA). Given a classification
problem with M classes (M > 2), the OVO approach on the
one hand divides an M-class problem into M∗(M−1)2 binary
problems. Each problem is handled by a separate binary
Algorithm 3 Intrusion detection based on LS-SVM
{Distinguishing intrusive network traffic from normal net-
work traffic in the case of multiclass}
Input: LS-SVM Normal Classifier, selected features (normal
class), an observed data item x
Output: Lx - the classification label of x
begin
Lx ← classification of x with LS-SVM of Normal class
if Lx == “Normal” then
Return LX
else
do: Run Algorithm 4 to determine the class of attack
end
end
classifier, which is responsible for separating the data of a
pair of classes.
The OVA approach, on the other hand, divides an M-
class problem into M binary problems. Each problem is
handled by a binary classifier, which is responsible for
separating the data of a single class from all other classes.
Obviously, the OVO approach requires more binary clas-
sifiers than OVA. Therefore, it is more computationally
intensive. Rifkin and Klautau [42] demonstrated that the
OVA technique was preferred over OVO. As such, the OVA
technique is applied to the proposed IDS to distinguish
between normal and abnormal data using the LS-SVM
method.
After completing all the aforementioned steps and the
classifier is trained using the optimal subset of features
which includes the most correlated and important features,
the normal and intrusion traffics can be identified by using
the saved trained classifier. The test data is then directed
to the saved trained model to detect intrusions. Records
matching to the normal class are considered as normal data,
and the other records are reported as attacks. If the classifier
model confirms that the record is abnormal, the subclass
of the abnormal record (type of attacks) can be used to
determine the record’s type. Algorithms 3 and Algorithm
4 describe the detection processes.
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Algorithm 4 Attack classification based on LS-SVM
Input: LS-SVM Normal Classifier, selected features (normal
class), an observed data item x
Output: Lx - the classification label of x
begin
Lx ← classification of x with LS-SVM of DoS class
if Lx==“DoS” then
Return LX
else
Lx ← classification of x with LS-SVM of Probe class
if Lx == “Probe” then
Return LX
else
Lx ← classification of x with LS-SVM of R2L class
if Lx == “R2L” then
Return LX
else
Lx == “U2R”;
Return LX
end
end
end
end
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Description of the Benchmark Datasets
Currently, there are only a few public datasets available
for intrusion detection evaluation. Among these datasets,
the KDD Cup 99 dataset, NSL-KDD dataset and Kyoto
2006+ dataset have been commonly used in the literature
to assess the performance of IDSes. According to the review
by Tsai et al. [43], the majority of the IDS experiments were
performed on the KDD Cup 99 datasets. In addition, these
datasets have different data sizes and various numbers of
features which provide comprehensive tests in validating
feature selection methods. Therefore, in order to facilitate
a fair and rational comparison with other state-of-the-art
detection approaches, we have selected these three datasets
to evaluate the performance of our detection system.
The KDD Cup 99 dataset is one of the most popular and
comprehensive intrusion detection datasets and is widely
applied to evaluate the performance of intrusion detection
systems [43]. It consists of five different classes, which are
normal and four types of attack (i.e., DoS, Probe, U2R
and R2L). It contains training data with approximately five
million connection records and test data with about two
million connection records. Each record in these datasets is
labeled as either normal or an attack, and it has 41 different
quantitative and qualitative features.
The NSL-KDD is a new revised version of the KDD Cup
99 that has been proposed by Tavallaee et al. in [24]. This
dataset addresses some problems included in the KDD Cup
99 dataset such as a huge number of redundant records
in KDD Cup 99 data. As in the case of the KDD Cup 99
dataset, each record in the NSL-KDD dataset is composed
of 41 different quantitative and qualitative features.
Each of the KDD Cup 99 and NSL-Kdd benchmarks
includes three different sets: training (the “10% KDD Cup
99′′ data and “KDDTrain+ ′′ respectively), testing (“kddcup
testdata′′ and “KDDTest+ ′′ respectively) and a set con-
taining samples of new attacks previously unseen in the
training data (the corrected labels KDD Cup 99 dataset and
KDDTest−21 dataset respectively).
The Kyoto 2006+ dataset was presented by Song et al.
[25]. The dataset covers over three years of real traffic data,
over the period between November 2006 and August 2009,
collected from both honeypots and regular servers that
were deployed at Kyoto University. Each connection in this
dataset has 24 different features.
5.2 Experimental Setup
In all experiments, the value of MI is estimated using the
estimator proposed by Kraskov et al. [33] (discussed in
Subsection 3.1). To select the best value of k used in the
estimator for the approach of k-nearest neoghbors, several
experiments with different values for k are conducted.
Through the experiments, we have found that the best
estimated value of MI was achieved when k = 6, which is the
same as the value suggested in [33]. In addition, the control
parameter β for MIFS algorithm is varied in the range of
[0,1], which is the range suggested in [11] and [34], with a
step size of 0.1. The optimal value of β that gives the best
accuracy rate is selected for a comparison with the proposed
approach.
Empirical evidence shows that 0.3 is the best value for
β in the three datasets, so we included the results with this
optimal β value for comparison. We have also included the
results with the value of β equal to 1, which is the same as
the value applied in [34]. The reason of choosing different
values of β is to test all possibilities of the feature rankings
since the best value is undefined for the given problem. The
experimental results of different values of β indicate that
when the value is closer to 1 the MIFS algorithm assigns
larger weights to the redundant features. In other words,
the algorithm places more emphasis on the relation between
input features rather than between input features and the
class and vice versa.
Based on the above findings, to demonstrate the su-
periority of the proposed feature selection algorithm, five
LSSVM-IDSs are built based on all features and the features
that are chosen using four different feature selection algo-
rithms (i.e., the proposed FMIFS, MIFS (β = 0.3), MIFS (β =
1), FLCFS), respectively, with k = 6. Three different datasets,
namely KDD Cup 99 [41], NSL-KDD [24] and Kyoto 2006+
dataset [25], are used to evaluate the performance of these
IDSs . The experimental results of the LSSVM-IDS based on
FMIFS are compared with the results using the other four
LSSVM-IDSs and several other state-of-the-art IDSs.
For the experiments on Kyoto 2006+ dataset, the data
of 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 August 2009 are selected, which
contain the latest updated data. For the experimental aims
on each dataset, 152460 samples are randomly selected. A
10-fold cross-validation is used to evaluate the detection
performance of the proposed LSSVM-IDS. In addition, in
order to make a comparison with the detection system
proposed in [20], the same sets of data captured from 1st
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TABLE 1: Comparison of feature ranking
(a) Feature ranking results on the KDD Cup 99 dataset
Algorithm # Feature Feature ranking
FMIFS 19 f5, f23, f6, f3, f36, f12, f24, f37, f2,f32, f9, f31, f29, f26, f17, f33, f35, f39, f34
MIFS (β=0.3) 25 f5, f23, f6, f9, f32, f18, f19, f15, f17, f16, f14, f7, f20, f11, f21, f13, f8, f22, f29, f31, f41, f1, f26, f10,
f37
MIFS (β=1) 25 f5, f7, f17, f32, f18, f20, f9, f15, f14, f21, f16, f8, f22, f19, f13, f11, f29, f1, f41, f31, f10, f27, f26, f12,
f28
FLCFS 17 f23, f29, f12, f24, f3, f36, f32, f2, f8, f31, f25, f1, f11, f39, f10, f4, f19
(b) Feature ranking results on the NSL-KDD dataset
Algorithm # Features Feature ranking
FMIFS 18 f5, f30, f6, f3, f4, f29, f12, f33, f26, f37,f39, f34, f25, f38, f23, f35, f36, f28
MIFS (β=0.3) 23 f5, f3, f26, f9, f18, f22, f20, f21, f14, f8, f11, f12, f7, f17, f16, f19, f1, f15, f41,f32, f13, f28, f36
MIFS (β=1) 28 f5, f22, f9, f26, f18, f20, f14, f21, f16, f8, f11, f1, f17, f7, f12, f19, f15, f40, f32, f13, f10, f28, f31, f27,
f2, f36, f23, f3
FLCFS 22 f29, f12, f33, f39, f4, f23, f34, f25, f26, f38, f8, f35, f19, f32, f18, f3, f6, f40, f30, f5, f27, f22
(c) Feature ranking results on the Kyoto 2006+ dataset
Algorithm # Feature Feature ranking
FMIFS 4 f19, f10, f2, f4
MIFS (β=0.3) 6 f19, f2, f10, f16, f7, f12
MIFS (β=1) 15 f19, f7, f16, f6, f12, f11, f17, f13,f8, f15, f18, f5, f9, f1, f2
FLCFS 7 f10, f17, f2, f12, f8, f6, f5
to 3rd November 2007 are chosen for evaluation too. The
comparison results are shown in Table 6.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
Several experiments have been conducted to evaluate the
performance and effectiveness of the proposed LSSVM-
IDS. For this purpose, the accuracy rate, detection rate,
false positive rate and F -measure metrics are applied. The
accuracy metric, detection rate and false positive rate are
defined by
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FN + FP
, (8)
DetectionRate =
TP
TP + FN
, (9)
FalsePositiveRate =
FP
FP + TN
, (10)
where, True Positive (TP) is the number of actual attacks
classified as attacks, True Negative (TN) is the number of
actual normal records classified as normal ones, False Pos-
itive (FP) is the number of actual normal records classified
as attacks, and False Negative (FN) is the number of actual
attacks classified as normal records.
The F -measure is a harmonic mean between precision p
and recall r [44]. In other words, it is a statistical technique
for examining the accuracy of a system by considering both
precision and recall of the system. F-measure used in this
paper assigns the same weights to both Precision Rate (PR)
and Recall Rate (RR), and is given by (11)
F −measure = 2(Precision ∗Recall)
Precision+Recall
. (11)
The precision (PR) is the proportion of predicted posi-
tives values which are actually positive. The precision value
directly affects the performance of the system. A higher
value of precision means a lower false positive rate and vice
versa. The precision is given by (12).
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
. (12)
The recall (RR) is another important value for measuring
the performance of the detection system and to indicate
the proportion of the actual number of positives which are
correctly identified. The recall is defined as:
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
. (13)
5.4 Results and Discussion
The classification performance of the intrusion detection
model combined with FMIFS, MIFS (β = 0.3), MIFS (β = 1)
and FLCFS and the model using all features based on the
three datasets are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. The results
clearly demonstrate that the classification performance of
an IDS is enhanced by the feature selection step. In addi-
tion, the proposed feature selection algorithm FMIFS shows
promising results in terms of low computational cost and
high classification results.
Table 2 summarizes the classification results of the dif-
ferent selection methods in regard to detection rates, false
positive rates and accuracy rates. It shows clearly that the
detection model combined with the FMIFS has achieved an
accuracy rate of 99.79%, 99.91% and 99.77% for KDD Cup 99,
NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+, respectively, and significantly
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TABLE 2: Performance classification for all attacks based on the three datasets
KDD Cup 99 NSL-KDD Kyoto 2006+
DR FPR Accuracy DR FPR Accuracy DR FPR Accuracy
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 99.46 0.13 99.79 98.76 0.28 99.91 99.64 0.13 99.77
LSSVM-IDS + MIFS (β=0.3) 99.38 0.23 99.70 95.96 0.53 97.96 98.59 0.16 99.32
LSSVM-IDS + MIFS (β=1) 89.26 0.34 97.63 93.26 0.47 96.75 98.10 0.58 99.12
LSSVM-IDS + FLCFS 98.47 0.61 98.41 92.29 0.41 96.45 98.07 0.82 98.99
LSSVM-IDS + All features 99.16 0.97 99.19 91.12 0.38 95.96 94.29 0.33 97.42
outperforms all other methods. In addition, the proposed
detection model combined with FMIFS enjoys the highest
detection rate and the lowest false positive rate in compari-
son with other combined detection models.
The proposed feature selection algorithm is computa-
tionally efficient when it is applied to the LSSVM-IDS. Fig-
ure 2 shows the building (training) and test times consumed
by the detection model using FMIFS compared with the
detection model using all features. The figure shows that
the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS performs better than LSSVM-IDS
with all 41 features on all datasets. There are significant dif-
ferences when performing experiments on KDD Cup 99 and
NSL-KDD and a slight difference on Kyoto 2006+ dataset by
comparison with the two aforementioned models.
1
Fig. 2: Building and testing times of LSSVM-IDS using all
features and LSSVM-IDS combined with FMIFS, respec-
tively, on three datasets.
5.5 Comparative Study
In order to demonstrate the performance of the LSSVM-IDS
+ FMIFS, experiments have been conducted to make com-
parisons with some state-of-the-art approaches. As men-
tioned in Section 4, the KDD Cup 99 is divided into five dif-
ferent classes and many experiments have been conducted
on DoS, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks. Table 3 shows the
selected features for the different attack classes. Tables 4,
Table 5 and Table 6 depict the comparison results based on
KDD Cup test, NSL-KDDTrain+ and Kyoto 2006+ datasets
respectively. The results illustrated in these tables strongly
indicate that the proposed detection model shows promis-
ing results compared with other models.
Table 4 shows the accuracy percentages achieved by
different detection models for the five classes on KDD Cup
99 dataset. Regarding the results obtained by other authors,
TABLE 3: Feature ranking results for the four types of
attacks on the KDD Cup 99 dataset
Class # Feature Feature ranking
DoS 12 f23, f5, f3, f6, f32, f24, f12, f2, f37, f36, f8, f31
Probe 19 f5, f27, f3, f35, f40, f37, f33, f17, f41, f30, f34,
f28, f22, f4, f24, f25, f19, f32, f29
U2R 23 f37, f17, f8, f18, f16, f1, f4, f15, f7, f22, f20,
f21, f31, f19, f12, f13, f14, f6, f32, f29, f3, f40,
f2
R2L 15 f3, f15, f5, f10, f9, f32, f33, f22, f1, f17, f24,
f11, f23, f8, f6
it can be seen that the proposed approach enjoys the best
accuracy among all models in all of the classes.
Table 5 demonstrates the result achieved by LSSVM-IDS
+ FMIFS compared with other approaches tested on NSL-
KDDTrain+ datasets in terms of the detection, false positive
and accuracy rate. It is clear that LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS enjoys
the best results at 99.94% accuracy, 98.93% detection rate and
0.28% false positive rate.
TABLE 4: Comparison results in terms of accuracy rate with
other approaches based on the KDD Cup 99 dataset (n/a
means no available results.)
System Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 99.79 99.86 99.91 99.97 99.92
SVM with PBR [14] 99.59 99.22 99.38 99.87 99.78
SVM [6] 99.55 99.25 99.70 99.87 99.78
Bayesian Network [15] 98.78 98.95 99.57 48.00 98.93
Flexible Neural Tree [16] 99.19 98.75 98.39 99.70 99.09
SVM + PSO and FS [45] 99.45 n/a n/a n/a n/a
SVM + SA and FS [46] 99.42 n/a n/a n/a n/a
TUIDS [19] 94.76 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Radial SVM [5] n/a 98.94 97.11 97.80 97.78
Table 6 shows a comparison with the results achieved by
CSV-ISVM proposed in [20] that has been tested on Kyoto
2006+ dataset. Through the results, both systems show
continuous improvement in detection rates and reduction
in false positive rates. However, the obtained results of the
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS are better, compared to CSV-ISVM
in any round of the iterations. The final results achieved
by LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS in the 10th iteration show 97.80%
and 0.43% of the final detection and false positive rates
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TABLE 5: Comparison results based on NSL-KDD dataset
(n/a means no available ressults.)
System # Feature DR FPR Accuracy
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 18 98.93 0.28 99.94
DMNB [47] all n/a 3.0 96.50
DBN-SVM [48] all n/a n/a 92.84
Bi-layer behavioral-based [21] 20 n/a n/a 99.20
TUIDS [19] all 98.88 1.12 96.55
FVBRM [49] 24 n/a n/a 97.78
C4.5 with linear correlation-
based [50]
17 n/a n/a 99.10
PSOM [22] 10 n/a n/a 88.30
HTTP based IDS [23] 13 99.03 1.0 99.38
Hybrid IDS [18] all 99.10 1.2 n/a
respectively, while CSV-ISVM produces 90.15% and 2.31%
of the final detection and false positive rates respectively.
The training and testing times taken by both systems are
also demonstrated in Table 6. Unlike CSV-ISVM, LSSVM-
IDS + FMIFS takes much less time. This is because LSSVM-
IDS + FMIFS uses a feature selection stage that c an re-
duce the number of needed features for the classifier to
five features. These features are: {source IP address, service,
dst host srv count, destination bytes, src bytes}.
5.6 Additional Comparison
The performance of the LSSVM-IDS model is further com-
pared with the PLSSVM model [12], which uses a feature se-
lection algorithm based on the mutual information method,
named MMIFS. The comparison results shown in Table 7
are based on the Corrected Labels sub-dataset of the KDD 99
dataset. The effectiveness of the two models is compared in
three aspects: the accuracy rate, average building time and
testing time in minutes.
TABLE 7: Accuracy, building time (min) and testing time
(min) for all different classes on the Corrected Labels of
the KDD Cup 99 dataset using LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS are
compared with those using PLSSVM + MMIFS proposed by
Amiri in [12].
Class
Name
Model Accuracy
(%)
Building
time
(min)
Testing
time
(min)
Normal LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 98.39 7.92 5.51
PLSSVM + MMIFS 99.1 25 11
DoS LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 98.93 10.06 4.50
PLSSVM + MMIFS 84.11 19 8
Probe LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 99.57 13.04 8.49
PLSSVM + MMIFS 86.12 35 13
U2R LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 99.66 0.47 0.32
PLSSVM + MMIFS 99.47 23 10
R2L LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 90.08 1.06 0.44
PLSSVM + MMIFS 98.70 5 4
Overall LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 97.33 6.51 3.85
PLSSVM + MMIFS 93.50 21.4 9.20
From Table 7, it can be observed that the proposed
system reduces the building time and testing time very
considerably for all categories. In addition, with respect to
the accuracy, both models have shown promising results
for all classes. It is clear from the table that LSSVM-IDS +
FMIFS has better accuracy in DoS, Probe and U2R classes,
while the PLSVM + MMIFS produces a better accuracy rate
when applied to Normal and R2L class. Moreover, the table
shows that LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS outperforms the PLSSVM
+ MMIFS model in the overall performance.
TABLE 8: Detection rate (%) for different algorithm perfor-
mances on the test dataset with Corrected Labels of KDD Cup
99 dataset (n/a means no available results.)
System Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L Overall
LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS 98.98 98.76 86.08 22.11 88.38 78.86
KDD’99 winner [2] 99.50 97.10 83.30 13.20 8.40 60.3
Kernel Miner [3] 99.42 97.47 84.52 11.84 7.32 60.11
PNrule [51] 99.50 96.90 73.20 6.60 10.70 57.38
SVM IDS [4] 99.3 91.6 36.65 12 22 52.31
Association rule [52] 99.50 96.80 74.90 3.8 7.9 56.58
ESC-IDS [7] 98.20 99.50 84.10 14.10 31.50 65.48
Clustering [17] 99.3 99.5 97.5 19.7 28.8 68.96
TUIDS [19] 90.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1
Fig. 3: Comparison results of F−measure rate on the Cor-
rected Labels of KDD Cup 99 dataset
Furthermore, the detection rate of LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS
has been compared with some other approaches that have
also been tested on the Corrected Labels dataset and the
results are shown in Table 8. Through Table 8, compared
to the KDD Cup 99 winner’s detection system and other
systems, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS achieves the best detection
rates for U2R and R2L attacks with rates of 22.11% and
88.38% respectively. The detection model proposed in [17]
provides the best detection rate for the Probe attack of
97.5%. For the normal class, all of KDD Cup 99 winner
[2], Association rule [52] and PNrule [51] achieve the best
result with 99.50% detection rate. However, overall, LSSVM-
IDS + FMIFS has achieved the best detection rate among all
systems.
Figure 3 illustrates a comparison between LSSVM-IDS
+FMIFS and the other two detection models proposed by
Tsang [53] in terms of F−measure rates. These two methods
have applied the genetic-fuzzy rule mining technique to
evaluate the importance of IDS features. This figure, makes
it obvious that the proposed model outperforms the Tsang
models in most of the classes including Normal, DoS, Probe
and R2L with 89.31%, 99.27%, 84.16% and 48.13%, respec-
tively. MOGFIDS provides the highest result in U2R class
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TABLE 6: Comparison performance of classification on the Kyoto 2006+ dataset (the days 2007, Nov. 1,2 and 3)
Iteration count LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS CSV-ISVM [20]
DR FPR Train(s) Test(s) DR FPR Train(s) Test(s)
1 96.01 0.84 0.152 0.246 79.65 4.54 1.823 7.76
2 97.01 0.64 0.296 0.396 84.72 4.03 3.463 10.363
3 97.13 0.64 0.505 0.656 85.58 3.92 5.26 15.443
4 97.18 0.64 1.140 1.343 86.08 3.80 9.662 19.532
5 97.26 0.60 1.475 1.773 86.81 3.54 11.302 22.735
6 97.32 0.57 2.228 2.643 87.24 3.33 13.593 25.887
7 97.61 0.55 3.214 3.773 88.08 3.03 14.348 28.23
8 97.61 0.53 4.343 5.172 88.10 3.01 17.475 31.615
9 97.70 0.45 5.585 6.508 89.64 2.52 23.02 35.547
10 97.80 0.43 7.275 8.408 90.15 2.31 27.257 40.097
of 25.09%. Overall, the results of the LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS
shown in this figure demonstrate satisfying performance
improvements compared with the other two methods.
Figure 4 shows a comparison of the proposed system
with those systems proposed in [24], [54] and [55] that have
been tested on the KDDTest−21 in terms of the classification
accuracy. Among those systems, the proposed detection
model achieved the best classification accuracy of 94.68%.
1
Fig. 4: Comparison results of classification accuracy on
KDDTest−21
After all, the large number of unseen attacks in the above
datasets that do not appear in the corresponding training
datasets make it even harder for an IDS to detect an attack.
For example, in the Corrected Labels dataset, Bouzida [56] has
shown that snmpgetattck and normal records have almost
the same features, and this makes it impossible for any IDS
to detect this type of attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
Recent studies have shown that two main components are
essential to build an IDS. They are a robust classification
method and an efficient feature selection algorithm. In this
paper, a supervised filter-based feature selection algorithm
has been proposed, namely Flexible Mutual Information
Feature Selection (FMIFS). FMIFS is an improvement over
MIFS and MMIFS. FMIFS suggests a modification to Battiti’s
algorithm to reduce the redundancy among features. FMIFS
eliminates the redundancy parameter β required in MIFS
and MMIFS. This is desirable in practice since there is no
specific procedure or guideline to select the best value for
this parameter.
FMIFS is then combined with the LSSVM method to
build an IDS. LSSVM is a least square version of SVM
that works with equality constraints instead of inequality
constraints in the formulation designed to solve a set of
linear equations for classification problems rather than a
quadratic programming problem. The proposed LSSVM-
IDS + FMIFS has been evaluated using three well known
intrusion detection datasets: KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and
Kyoto 2006+ datasets. The performance of LSSVM-IDS +
FMIFS on KDD Cup test data, KDDTest+ and the data,
collected on 1, 2 and 3 November 2007, from Kyoto dataset
has exhibited better classification performance in terms of
classification accuracy, detection rate, false positive rate and
F -measure than some of the existing detection approaches.
In addition, the proposed LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has shown
comparable results with other state-of the-art approaches
when using the Corrected Labels sub-dateset of the KDD
Cup 99 dataset and tested on Normal, DoS, and Probe
classes; it outperforms other detection models when tested
on U2R and R2L classes. Furthermore, for the experiments
on the KDDTest−21 dataset, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS produces
the best classification accuracy compared with other de-
tection systems tested on the same dataset. Finally, based
on the experimental results achieved on all datasets, it
can be concluded that the proposed detection system has
achieved promising performance in detecting intrusions
over computer networks. Overall, LSSVM-IDS + FMIFS has
performed the best when compared with the other state-of-
the-art models.
Although the proposed feature selection algorithm
FMIFS has shown encouraging performance, it could be
further enhanced by optimizing the search strategy. In addi-
tion, the impact of the unbalanced sample distribution on an
IDS needs to be given a careful consideration in our future
studies.
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